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Abstract: Not only is resiliency a term with a myriad of definitions 
microscopically specified by a wide variety of social and bio/physical scientists 
and practitioners, it is also incredibly complicated even when treated by 
individual academic/government/non-profit and business practitioners who are 
convinced that they have the perfect definition. By then linking the concepts of 
infrastructure and community to resiliency, not only does additional complexity 
emerge but also a powerful imperative to examine the basics necessary to 
achieve resiliency within these interrelated concepts. The lens of the applied 
academic observer situated at ‘ground zero’ for not only one but two major 
catastrophes within a micro minute span of less than five years (Hurricane 
Katrina and its 2005–2007 relatives and the British Petroleum oil well blow out 
of 2010, layered on pervasive localised sea level rise due to delta subsidence) is 
the ‘data’ analysed to support the arguments of this paper about what must be 
considered with regard to infrastructure and community to even hope to 
achieve a resilience state: essential resilience, exceptional recovery and serious 
appreciation for the need for a greater recovery scale. 
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1 Introduction 
At the beginning of this first decade of the 21st century, social scientists were excited 
about a concept to which they were being introduced from the bio and physical sciences. 
We social scientists are taught to resist such crossover offerings. Other than the genetic 
determinism that promotes particular behaviours, we believe that physical ‘laws’ do not 
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explain how we behave. Humans give meaning to the physical before they respond; the 
physical must become a symbol, i.e., have that meaning, before action about it takes 
place. Such a layer of meaning is thought not to be part of the ecosystem’s action process. 
Ecosystem resiliency has no ‘mind force’. 
But, despite the admonitions to do otherwise, the ecosystem term ‘resiliency’ was 
embraced to explain human behaviour because its meaning was useful to imagine 
conditions, outcomes, different from the meaning given by terms we had been using in 
community and risk response analysis.1 It overcame the objections of ‘development’ 
which implies that a community is ill fated unless it is growing; similarly ‘sustainability’, 
while it is quite a good concept, has an intransigent, rigid imagery of steady state. 
Resiliency encourages us to think about variable conditions, responses and how they 
contribute fluidly to a community’s capacity to continue functioning while in effect  
re-inventing itself. It also has a quality of encouraging imagining, reflection, that the 
other terms may not (Tatsuki and Comafay, 2010). Consider the difference in capacity to 
imagine positive futures between ‘vulnerability’ and ‘resiliency’. Given the amazing 
challenges that communities worldwide are increasingly facing with regard to 
environmental hazards, we must put the term resiliency to the challenge for this quality 
and for others that it has. We need every symbol we can conceptualise, and every theory 
that uses it, to guide understanding and action toward the changes in community form 
and process that must be recognised and achieved. 
2 The setting 
New Orleans, Louisiana is a metropolitan area which sits in a bend of the Mississippi 
River, 90 nautical miles from the Gulf of Mexico. The river delta at that proximity to the 
sea is flat, sinking and subject to rapid loss of the existing land due to: the leveeing of the 
river and thus the lands inaccessibility to its spring sediment load; the naturally caused 
diminishment of the land by subsidence from organic decay of the sediments and from 
powerful storm impacts; and the human economic uses, especially navigation and oil/gas 
exploration and production. This locale presents tremendous risk to property and to life 
when the tropical systems cross the delta flooding the area and the levees compound the 
risk by preventing the water’s return to the sea. No exits from the city on the east bank of 
the river are available that do not traverse land below sea level and water bodies. 
Unfortunately, it might be possible to state with no challenges, that the city is the most 
vulnerable to flooding of all US coastal cities. What it experienced with hurricane Katrina 
would be the data to support this unfortunate claim and the social vulnerability present 
would make the ‘capping’ argument. Added to these physical qualities is the way in 
which the city was created by development interests that enhanced the risk due to the 
manner in which it grew into the riskiest, i.e., low lying, parts of the ecosystem, in  
effect ‘manufacturing’ more risk than the environment itself might have posed  
(Youngman, 2011). 
2.1 Resilience as ‘bedrock’ 
The residents of New Orleans who had no automobiles or who chose not to use them to 
evacuate the city when Katrina struck – some because they did not have the money to 
travel – languished in the Super Dome and then the Convention Center, awaiting a rescue 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    Dimensions of resiliency 49    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
with the expectation that it would occur at a pace and quality at least equal to what the 
US military has provided for other countries experiencing catastrophes. That was not to 
happen. They remained with only limited water and food for six long, sweltering days 
and in full view of the world through the media. The world asked: ‘Why?’ And while we 
applied social scientists living and working at ‘ground zero’ began to sense the answer, 
we were reluctant to articulate it. The reality was that the storm and the flooding that 
followed a day later ‘revealed’ a community with massive vulnerabilities not just, or  
even most importantly, to the physical ones described above, but rather to the  
social – structural inequities, poverty, racism/race divisions and a government barely 
operable. 
A catastrophe occurred rather than a disaster because the community had no capacity 
to respond. It also occurred, however, because the community had no comprehensive 
appreciation of the risk we were under, nor had it taken risk reduction seriously. How 
horrific it was to watch the suffering of those left behind. Their sacrifice indelibly marked 
into the mind of Americans what such vulnerability brings. It was the most dramatic 
transformation of thinking by a national population of a sociological concept than ever 
could have been imagined. Social and economic vulnerability was the cause of the 
catastrophe, not the wind, rain, storm surge or even the faulty hurricane protection. And 
the country knew it. 
It became very evident from these observations that resiliency requires consideration 
of ‘essential’ bed rock resiliency, rather than merely post-event capacity to rebound as 
has been extolled through the application of the term too directly from the physical 
concept of resiliency (Laska, 2008). While an ecosystem does not think or prepare, 
humans can/do. And most important to essential resiliency, they can strive for it on a 
normalised, daily basis, not simply in the framing of the immediate response to the 
hazard event. 
2.2 ‘A mere glancing blow’ 
This approach to resiliency is not the usual one. Others at this conference will have 
expanded the more widely accepted definition that focuses on what will happen to a 
community when it experiences the hazard event, be it a swift one or a long term. 
Resiliency, according to the more accepted definition prevents the community’s capacity 
from declining too far in the recovery phase thus enhancing the prospects of a rapid 
return to the conditions before the event. The difference is that the emphasis of the more 
common definition is on the preparation for and response to the disaster. If one 
approaches resiliency in the manner proposed herein, one would expect that the dip 
would be tiny and the recovery slope very steep, a goal also of the more traditional 
definition. But in the approach I am proposing, the impact of the physical event would be 
merely ‘a glancing blow’ because of the ‘essential’ resiliency that characterises the 
community. By this I mean a complex form of resiliency that is pervasive. 
An example demonstrates the difference. A very large emergency response for those 
without cars or the infirmed for example would not be necessary as it is today in  
New Orleans if essential resiliency existed. Families and individuals as well as 
neighbourhoods would be well educated and concomitantly would contain well employed 
workers. Thus, they would have cars to evacuate and money to pay for gas, motels, and 
food. Medical services would be available and affordable so that prevention would be 
emphasised and medical issues treated early. Thus, the populous would not have the high 
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level of illness manifested in New Orleans that requires special considerations in the 
evacuation plan. And adult children would not have to leave the city for employment and 
thus leave their older parents to fend for themselves with family support networks 
weakened. 
Consider the answer to these two questions: 
Q1 How many shelter beds are needed to evacuate a socially/economically vulnerable 
metropolitan region? A1. 109,000+2 (Donley, 2007) 
Q2 How many shelter beds are needed to evacuate a socially/economically robustly 
resilient metropolitan region? A2. 0 
Both answers are underestimated: More beds are needed than are currently provided for 
this socially/economically vulnerable region and more than zero beds would be needed 
for even the most essentially resilient region. But the gap between the shelter needs of the 
two different types of communities is not underestimated. It is a chasm. Right now New 
Orleans has only the resiliency possible with such essential vulnerability. 
To explore this idea further, it is possible to take this logic and work backwards from 
what would be needed for a resilient community to exist. The logic is similar to the 
analysis which says that the roots of crime lie with inadequate public education not with 
the number of prisons built to receive the criminals. Resilient ‘shortcuts’ such as the 
efforts since Katrina reveal the ‘essential’ vulnerability. A politically (Freudenburg et al., 
2008), economically, socially (Laska and Morrow, 2006) and educationally ‘healthy’ 
community is a resilient community – to whatever risk comes along, economic, natural 
hazard, health or technological. 
Or as with the Louisiana example, the region would have been, would be, more 
resilient to the onslaught of the co-occurrence of the multiple hazards – economic, 
natural and technological disasters that have occurred if it had practised essential 
resiliency. We have and are currently experiencing: 
• major delta land loss exacerbated by oil exploration that mimics eustatic global sea 
level rise 
• the natural hazard events of multiple, powerful hurricanes – Katrina and the other 
three hurricanes of the 2005 and 2007 seasons (Rita, Gustav and Ike) 
• two technological hazards, the flood wall failures and the oil rig blowout 
• the international recession 
• the beginning effects of sea level rise. 
It would easy to argue that the region is an anomaly of what may be the situation of other 
world regions but disaster events since, including the Japanese triple event of the 
earthquake/tsunami/nuclear power plant accident and the challenges of response and 
recovery of a developed society tell us a different message. 
In the case of southeast Louisiana and Japan, the burden of a resilient response has 
been challenged perhaps beyond what an essentially resilient community can handle; but 
with such social and economic vulnerabilities as exist in southeast Louisiana, the 
challenges have been overwhelming. 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    Dimensions of resiliency 51    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
In an essentially resilient region not only will the risk ‘driver’ have less of an effect, 
in some cases the actual risk might have been prevented from occurring. In fact some of 
the events just iterated are even less likely to have happened in the first place if Louisiana 
had been more robust in its essential resilience. ‘Essential’ resiliency would have reduced 
the list of risks just described above. 
For example, we ask ourselves if we should have/could have done more to demand 
better treatment of the ecosystem by the oil/gas industry. Why did not we? Perhaps 
because as a peripheral, extracting region we traded environmental safety for economic 
benefit and thus the risks have been ‘stacking’ (Freudenburg, 1992). And following this 
logic, the argument would continue that moving fast forward to those resilient elements 
to be implemented just before the disaster event misses the point of where the prime 
target of resiliency effort should be: very early in the social/economic bedrock. 
Can this hypothesis be tested, that is of observing the differences for two 
communities that experience a similar hazard of a similar magnitude or of comparable 
hazards but are different in their basic resilience dimensions? It is likely possible to do so. 
And one could continue the analysis by considering the differential need for emergency 
and immediate recovery resources between the two communities. Providing the latter is 
very costly and drains state and local resources. One of the reasons that the state of 
Louisiana is attempting to expand its shelters to retain its evacuating citizens within its 
borders is because it is required to cost share the expense of sheltering its citizens that the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) pays for outside of Louisiana.3 
2.3 ‘Exceptional’ recovery 
Following this logic of ‘essential’ resiliency, there is a requirement for ‘exceptional’ 
recovery with each disaster event so that the basic resiliency capacity can be built up in 
the recovery from each disaster event that occurs in the same location. The diagram 
below demonstrates this process. By incorporating vulnerability reduction efforts 
systematically and calculatingly when rebuilding from a severe damaging disaster, the 
essential social institutional and social resiliency capitol is accumulated through the 
enhanced structural improvements. FEMA administrator, Craig Fugate, in speaking at the 
University of Colorado Natural Hazards Workshop in 2008, before assuming leadership 
of FEMA, stated (paraphrased): A community that does not rebuild back safer is not a 
recovered community. This is to the point that the diagram represents (Figure 1). 
Growing in appreciation of the linkage between the physical and the social, 
challenges the traditional ways we usually think. The US Army Corps of Engineers gave 
a UNO-CHART team of social scientists and practitioners (the latter mostly former state 
and FEMA senior recovery and mitigation officials now with disaster consulting firms) 
an opportunity to consider these issues (Laska et al., 2009). The Corps’ principal  
activity is building structures – dams and levees – that have as their goal protection of 
communities and human activities. However, very little imagining of the linkage between 
the structural and social is undertaken by the Corps before the structures are built. 
Construction decisions have been based heavily on engineering issues once ‘the project’ 
has been blessed by political (Congressional delegation) leaders who must advocate for 
the funding to be appropriated and authorised. 
 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   52 S. Laska    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
Figure 1 Resilience deltas when community function is/is not enhanced by pre-event 
vulnerability reduction measures 
?
 
Katrina was a ‘wake up call’ to suggest that more must be done with the physical/social 
relationship. The Corps calls these community elements ‘other social effects’ (OSE) and 
they are distinguished from the national and regional economic benefits of a project and 
the environmental impacts that might cause harm. The economic and environmental are 
the three of the four that are required by law to be considered; the fourth, the social 
benefits are not required to be considered and thus have been ignored since they were 
first described in the 1970s (Dunning and Durden, 2007). The team (Laska et al., 2009) 
conceptualised the social structures (Table 1) and processes (Table 2) that must exist in a 
resilient community.4 
To best use the government resources that will be applied to addressing a flooding 
problem, the report argues that through a community engagement process such as social 
impact assessment (SIA) community residents must be asked what of these social 
structures do they particularly value and thus want protected. Together the communities 
and the government agencies should together determine how best they can be protected 
with the possible assistance of a physical structure of a particular configuration. In other 
words it should not be assumed that the physical will help – some specialists believe 
macro infrastructure enhances risk – or that a particular engineering proposal is the best 
design.5 With the focus of this workshop on social capitol, resiliency and community 
engagement, the time could not be better to bring the OSE back fully into the 
conversation for not only the Corps’ projects but also for all other physical infrastructure 
efforts – hazard-hardened buildings as well as levees – initiated by all federal and lower 
government level agencies. 
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Table 1 Community and institutional structures and resources 
Education 
• Educational opportunities 
• Educational physical infrastructure and 
personnel 
• Traditional knowledge, especially 
ecological 
Criminal justice 
• Community crime/violence safety 
• Police, court, incarceration, domestic 
violence shelter facilities and personnel 
• Informal ‘policing’ by community 
members 
Neighbourhood/housing 
• Housing characteristics: supply, cost, 
condition, tenancy (rent vs. own) 
• Residential stability 
• Community sub-area infrastructure, public 
service and neighborhood businesses 
• Homeless programs 
• Historic buildings and districts 
Household/family 
• Density/home sharing 
• Support services for homeownership 
• Safe housing for all income levels 
Business 
• Commercial/business stability/diversity 
• Small business sector 
• Informal exchange (bartering) networks 
• Family livelihood systems 
Income, employment, labour force 
• Economic activity of population 
• Livelihood activities of community 
• Personal/household income 
• Personal household livelihood 
• Employment/income dispersion/stability 
• Occupational diversity 
• Community socioeconomic characteristics 
Health and physical safety 
• Healthy lifestyle 
• Access to clinical care services 
(especially: trauma, gastrointestinal, 
neurological, diarrheal outbreak 
investigation, poison control referrals, 
national pharmaceutical stockpile, etc.) 
• Access to disaster mental health 
(especially: psychological first aid, 
mental-health referral) 
• Access to environmental health services 
(especially: septic and water inspections, 
food service inspections, surveillance for 
vector-borne diseases) 
• Access to specialised high-technology 
lifesaving equipment and therapy (e.g., 
dialysis, ventilators, ACLS, ATLS, etc.) 
• Informal care-giving systems 
• Access to specialised services for 
vulnerable populations unable to 
physically or psychologically access 
necessary care 
• Community health risk factors – 
environmental, mental health exposure, 
vulnerable populations 
Mortality rates, causes 
• Surge facilities and personnel (e.g., 
emergency-worker liability, ESAR-VHP 
volunteer call-up systems) 
Governmental organisation 
• Organisational structure and functioning 
of government 
• Sustained critical infrastructure 
(especially: telecommunications, water, 
sewage, power, streets, public buildings, 
etc.) 
• Provision of public services (e.g., 
planning, taxation, permitting, public 
transportation, education, public health, 
emergency ops/incident command, etc.) 
• Exercise of democratic participation (e.g., 
voting, letters to the editor, civil action 
groups, billboards and posters, etc.) 
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Table 1 Community and institutional structures and resources (continued) 
Community social services 
• Availability and access to basic range of 
formal social service programs (e.g., family 
counselling, parenting, family violence, 
seniors, chemical dependency, children 
services including child care, disabilities, 
welfare benefits/job training, foster care, 
mental health, disabled transportation, etc.) 
• Informal instrumental support services, 
especially for the children, elderly, 
physically or mentally disabled, and other 
vulnerable populations (e.g., extended 
family members caring for the young and 
the old, or faith communities providing 
meals-on-wheels, home repair, shopping, 
transportation, or emergency first response) 
 
Table 2 Community interpersonal capital 
Ideal interpersonal conditions 
• Trust of government 
• Community identification/attachment 
• Community cohesiveness 
• Community cooperation and tolerance 
• Density of social networks and linkages between networks 
• Distribution and sharing of resources and power 
• Civil and human rights 
• Environmental justice 
• Community diversity 
• Shared narratives, places, meanings, histories and spirit 
Interaction means to achieve conditions (social structures mediating human interactions) 
• Community leadership – informal and formal 
• Informal governance 
• Political organizations and citizen political involvement 
• NGO adequacy vis-à-vis community needs 
• Voluntary associations and membership 
• Religious organizations 
• Neighborhood (place based) voluntary organizations and sharing 
• Friendship/family networks 
• Regional/national linkages 
• Print and electronic media array, diversity, access 
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Figure 2 New public school elevated above flood of record (see online version for colours) 
 
Figure 3 New public school elevated to required elevation (see online version for colours) 
 
Attention to the linkage of the physical infrastructure to the social keeps the focus  
where it should be for essential resiliency. A current example of potentially  
risk-reduction-enhanced infra structure from post Katrina in New Orleans is the improved 
public school system. A charter school system now educates most children attending 
public school in New Orleans and appears to be contributing to the revitalisation of the 
educational process. Many of the schools were destroyed or badly damaged by the 
hurricane; thus these charter schools are about to occupy new buildings funded by the US 
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Department of Housing and Urban Development Community Development  
Block Grants (CDBG). However, there are some questions about whether enhanced 
diligence is being paid to making sure these new structures are ‘exceptionally enhanced’ 
in storm resiliency. While they are being built to the legally required elevation (base 
flood elevation, BFE), there does not seem to be any additional effort underway to 
systematically storm proof them through additional elevation and wet and dry 
floodproofing.6 Some schools are elevated ‘exceptionally’ (Figure 2); others are only at 
the BFE (Figure 3). 
The green building movement, i.e., construction that reduces energy usage, has been 
very strong in New Orleans since the hurricane. They have succeeded in getting the 
designers of the schools to pay attention to LEED certification7 to a certain extent but 
similar attention does not appear to be occurring uniformly across schools for storm 
resilience.8 There are no advocates and no federal encouragement/requirements to protect 
the key public buildings beyond the minimum requirements.9 When approached on the 
topic recently on the occasion of his visit to New Orleans for the fifth anniversary of 
Hurricane Katrina, Administrator Fugate described efforts to strengthen public buildings 
in Florida when he headed efforts there that he called ‘mitigation plus’.10 Current 
legislation proposed in Congress to modify the Stafford Act would permit the use of 
federal mitigation funds to elevate structures to the ‘flood of record’ rather than to only 
the BFE, an option begging to be created for the sake of exceptional resilience (Laska  
et al., 2010). 
2.4 ‘Scaling up the exceptional recovery’ 
The American FEMA developed a residential building flood insurance program in 1968, 
the National Flood Insurance Program, to stem the rising cost of tax-payer funded relief 
for flood victims (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2002). It has had the 
secondary outcome of being an ‘enabler’ of communities who want to expand their 
footprint into flood-vulnerable areas (Burby et al., 1985). FEMA has tried to keep the 
insurance program solvent by developing a robust mitigation program for the homes  
that carry flood insurance. In 1988, the Stafford Act complemented this program  
with mitigation funding post disasters, the hazard mitigation grant program (HMGP). 
While this funding can be used for the reduction of flood risk of both public  
buildings as well as residential homes, the outcome by far emphasises residences (Laska 
et al., 2010). 
In the case of modest disasters the logic of these programs makes sense. ‘Capture’ 
those homes for mitigation in specific parts of a community when they are flooded. 
UNO-CHART has been funded by FEMA for eight years to support just such a goal with 
repeatedly flooded homes.11 However, when an entire community is severely damaged 
(Figure 4), i.e., experiences a catastrophe, the lack of a more comprehensive mitigation 
effort negatively impacts the community’s resilient recovery, i.e., exceptional recovery, 
because of a lack of focus on a neighbourhood/community scale. While 80% of the 
homes in New Orleans were flooded, and 100% of those in neighbouring St. Bernard 
Parish – a county of 30,000 homes, so too were a huge number of schools, churches, 
shopping areas, public housing complexes, rental apartments, Section 8 units (federally 
subsidised) for lower income residents, police and fire response facilities, libraries, day 
care centres, and a huge array of businesses. 
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Figure 4 Extent of Katrina flooding (see online version for colours) 
 
The modus operandi of mitigating one residential structure at a time with little emphasis 
on storm-hardening of all the types of structures that I have just listed does not use the 
precious mitigation funds to the best interest of the destroyed community nor the 
taxpayer (Figure 5). The scale of risk reduction must be at the neighbourhood and the 
community level (Laska, 2007). It must also encourage more drainage projects when 
those will mitigate the resiliency of wider areas of a community. Given the resiliency 
opportunity which a catastrophe provides, the ‘window of opportunity’ is too vast to 
miss. Those interested in rebuilding New Orleans in an energy efficient manner (‘green’) 
have embraced the opportunity (Laitner et al., 2007) and far surpassed the impact that we 
hazard mitigation advocates have been able to achieve. And, how else to achieve the 
physical support of the social structure and social capital that is resiliency than to focus 
on a broader scale of mitigation? No other logic makes sense. 
Figure 5 Unsafe and safer houses elevated post Katrina (see online version for colours) 
 
In order to overcome the harm to essential resiliency of these long-time policies, it is 
important to begin emphasising the ‘Big Picture’ of supporting resiliency within 
communities struck by major disasters. Physical infrastructure should be considered at 
the neighbourhood, district and community scale when a large amount of a community’s 
building stock is destroyed. While the FEMA community rating system (CRS) assumes  
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the philosophy that is being advocated here – addressing flooding comprehensively, it is a 
slow process when no disaster occurs – so many points for an array of risk reduction 
activities to maintain or achieve flood insurance savings for the entire community. When 
a major disaster occurs, the local public employees responsible for the CRS ‘pieces’ are 
engaged in more immediate response and early recovery needs such as developing a 
damage assessment process and then a building permit and a construction inspection 
process to follow. They cannot resume their usual responsibilities and thus it is difficult 
to reduce risk reduction through the CRS during the recovery from a severe disaster. 
The harm of not emphasising ‘widespread uniform flood protection’ is clearly 
revealed when one asks the following questions about the functional challenge of spotty 
protection. Where would you want to locate your business if you saw a neighbourhood or 
district in which the public, private and residential decisions were made in a ‘chorus’ of 
risk reduction (Figure 6) versus one that is uneven with regard to flood protection  
(Figure 5)? Where will there be customers after another disaster? Where will there be 
congregants for religious organisations? Where will there be library or playground users? 
Where will the homes have any value at all the next time the area is flooded?12 One 
elevated home does not provide the owner with any future monetary benefit if the area 
floods again and only a few houses and other structures are elevated. If you will return to 
reviewing the figures one more time at the end of this paper the point is clearly made by 
looking together at the elevated school (Figure 2) and the non-mitigated strip mall  
(Figure 7). The two structures are back to back of one another only one small block apart. 
What essential resiliency does that logic provide for a government policy for catastrophic 
flood recovery? It is extremely important that we learn from recovery shortcomings of 
Katrina as well as the positive outcomes. 
Figure 6 Neighbourhood scale of resiliency (see online version for colours) 
 
Figure 7 Strip mall (2011) with no mitigation anticipated (see online version for colours) 
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3 Conclusions 
Advocating government support and encouragement for such a complex interplay of 
public, business, non-profit, religious, public and rental housing and home  
owner decisions to reduce risk and thus contribute to the community’s essential  
resilience is complex and thus will require re-organisation difficult to achieve. However, 
there does not appear to be anything inherently prohibitive about the model in principle 
or in practise. However, it will require FEMA recognising the specific resiliency 
opportunities of extreme flood disasters and modifying mitigation policy to not only offer 
flood insurance for all types of buildings – residential, commercial and public, but to 
develop new policy to encourage – in effect require – intense risk reduction for all 
structures, i.e., to protect social institutions and social capitol, at a higher scale of 
community. It is imperative that FEMA work more pro-actively with impacted 
communities to use the federal-level resources for mitigation at such a broader 
community level. 
We must: 
• aim for the essential resiliency bedrock to achieve a mere glancing blow 
• not exchange response/recovery resiliency efforts for essential resiliency – make 
them complementary 
• require exceptional recovery 
• not let ourselves get caught up in singular elements of the resiliency  
equation – greater scale, the more complex picture is imperative, and in addition 
• continually assess how we can work for risk reduction improvements not yet even 
imagined. 
Finally, on the ground observations of the federal government engagement with the BP 
oil spill response alerted this social scientist to re-think the degree to which federal level 
agencies are able to respond effectively to catastrophes.13 The 2011 Japanese earthquake, 
tsunami and nuclear power plant meltdown brought this question again to the forefront. 
Supporting the improved capacity of local cultures and their formal governments to 
appreciate these framings (essential resiliency, exceptional recovery, scale) may be the 
better investment. Recent research post these catastrophes in rural coastal Louisiana 
suggest that is the case (Laska and Peterson, 2011). Implementation of pre-disaster 
planning for post-disaster recovery such as has been done in the west coast of Florida 
(Lee County) is a new concept that is in this vein of local commitment to resiliency 
(Schwab, 2010). 
For a place like coastal Louisiana, these important goals – community capacity and 
upper level government engagement – must all occur within the context of long-term 
recovery from the current multiple extreme disasters. It is daunting but absolutely 
necessary for there to be any future for such a region as at risk to extreme flood and storm 
damage and industrial accidents as is the human-inhabited tip of the Mississippi River 
Delta. 
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Notes 
1 In addition very recent work even suggests that bio-ecosystem resiliency might demonstrate 
statuses quite antithetical to the goals of human communities, i.e., that ‘crashes’ are functional 
and disequilibrium normal (Cooper and Walker, 2011). 
2 Applied research done before hurricane Katrina by UNO-CHART in support of efforts to 
partner evacuating faith congregants with car-less congregants led to an estimate from the 
2,000 U.S. Census of 125,000 New Orleanians without cars (Laska, 2004; Jenkins et al., 2007, 
2010). This estimate was captured by media and scholars and used frequently post-Katrina to 
describe the challenge of the lower-income residents of the city in evacuating for Katrina. The 
109,000 beds currently available for evacuees is in line with that number because it includes 
those with cars who don’t have money for shelter and is a regional need, not just one for the 
central city county – Orleans – that now has 100,000 fewer people than before Katrina. 
3 Personal communication, Casey Levy, Governor’s Office of Homeland Security, Oct., 2010. 
4 Congressional response to Katrina required that the Corps be committed to judging projects 
with the OSE’s in mind as well as the other three: “While the 1983 standards emphasized 
economic development alone, the new approach calls for development of water resources 
projects based on sound science that maximize net national economic, environmental, and 
social benefits”. (Council of Environmental Quality, 2010) As the process of creating the 
Principles and Guidelines have gone forward, some within the Corps are concerned that this 
social benefits requirement is being ‘watered down’ due to the reluctance to develop means of 
assessing such benefits. Therefore, again, inadequate consideration of the social benefits will 
result (Personal communications.) 
5 Some American disaster specialists disagree with Dutch and American civil engineers who 
cast their lot with large infrastructure projects that are seen as being an easier approach to 
protect the physical infrastructure needed to accomplish the protection of social structure and 
social capitol. One person is John Lopez, creator of the ‘Multiple Lines of Defense’ (2008). 
Attempting to reduce flood risk through large-scale physical structures is seen by critics to be 
a low annoyance effort for modest flooding risk reduction but a high risk solution for  
large events unless massive structures are put into place with both huge monetary and 
environmental costs (White, 1960). As Gilbert White is quoted frequently: “There are only 
two types of levees: those that have failed and those that will”. 
6 Wet floodproofing focuses on building materials that are resistant to water; dry on keeping 
water out of the structure by means of barriers. 
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7 According to the U.S. Green Building Council the Leadership in Energy and Environmental 
Design (LEED) green building certification program “encourages and accelerates global 
adoption of sustainable green building and development practices through a suite of rating 
systems that recognize projects that implement strategies for better environmental and health 
performance”. 
8 Personal conversation with community LEED activists. 
9 The hazard-strengthening of critical infrastructure is required by the federal government 
through a dated Executive Order, but strict enforcement does not occur. Mitigation specialists 
are pushing for a new executive order for critical infrastructure hoping that it would spark 
renewed attention to the issue. However, it will likely not include the broad spectrum of public 
buildings to which this paper is referring. Personal communication with Larry Buss, U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers, retired. 
10 Personal communication with Craig Fugate, August 28, 2010. 
11 See www.floodhelp.uno.edu for a description of this program. 
12 Content from workshop presentations currently being made by UNO-CHART team as 
subcontractors to the state of Louisiana’s Governor’s Office of Homeland Security and 
Emergency Preparedness (GOHSEP) Community Education and Outreach (CEO) program 
funded by FEMA through HMGP Katrina funds. 
13 Cooper and Walker (2011) report from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s  
post-Katrina report to the effect that the “manifest failure of federal preparedness and 
evacuation procedures in New Orleans (suggests sic) that it is ‘unrealistic’ to expect the 
government to respond effectively to the challenges of catastrophic risk in the 21st century” 
[The White House, (2006), p.52]. 
